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RECENT CASES OF INTEREST
During recent months there has been an upsurge of
judicial activity in the area of administrative law. As
usual, the cases are collected and ably summarized by Prof.
Bernard Schwartz in the Administrative Law Review. l/
Three of the cases discussed by Prof. Schwartz may
have particular interest for the readers of this Journal.
In Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 2/ the
Supreme Court continued its apparent retreat from the
doctrine of Northern Pipeline, 3/ and held that the CFTA may
decide state law counterclaims in reparation proceedings
voluntarily brought before that agency. In University of
Tennessee v. Elliott, 4/ the Supreme Court held that a
decision by a State ALJ, unreviewed by the State courts,
finding that no racial discrimination occurred, will be
given collateral estoppel effect in a subsequent federal
district court civil rights action based on the same circum-
stances, if the ALJ's decision would be given that effect
under the applicable state law. Finally, in Utica Packing
Co. v. Block, 5/ the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit rendered an instructive opinion on the independence
of adjudicatory officers. Selections from that opinion are
reprinted below (pp. 107-114).
Other important cases dealing with separation and
delegation of powers, rulemaking, investigatory power and
1/ Administrative Law Cases during 1986 39 Ad. L. Rev.
117. The Administrative Law Review is a publication of the
Administrative Law Section of the American Bar Association.
Prof. John H. Reese, Editor-in-Chief of the Administrative
Law Review has once again generously granted permission to
reproduce portions of Prof. Schwartz' article.
2/ 106 S. Ct. 3245 (infra).
3/ Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458
U.S. 50 (1982).
4/ 106 S.Ct 3220 (1986).
5/ 781 F.2d 71 (6th Cir. 1986).
judicial review are discussed by Prof. Schwartz, but are
omitted from this issue of the NAALJ Journal. While some of
these may be discussed in future issues, informed readers
will want to consult the Spring 1987 issue of the Adminis-
trative Law Review, from which two excerpts are here
reprinted.
Agencies Versus Courts
The public rights/private rights distinction,
which the Northern Pipeline 6/ plurality opinion revived as
the criterion upon which delegations of adjudicatory author-
ity to agencies may turn, was repudiated in last year's
Thomas case. 7/ As Justice O'Connor explains Thomas, "this
Court has rejected any attempt to make determinative for
Article III purposes the distinction between public rights
and private rights." 8/ This statement was made in Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 9/ where the Court further
refined the subject of administrative adjudicatory authority.
At issue in Schor was the power of the CFTC to assume
jurisdiction over common law counter-claims in a reparations
case brought before it by a private party. The Court held
that the agency's interpretation of the statute as giving it
the power to take jurisdiction over counterclaims was
reasonable and well within the scope of its delegated
authority. The lower court had ruled, however, that Con-
gress did not possess the constitutional authority to vest
in a non-Article III court the power to adjudicate, render
final judgment, and issue binding orders in a traditional
contract action arising under state law.
The Supreme Court reversed. According to it,
Article III does not confer an absolute right to the plenary
consideration of every claim by an Article III court. In
determining the extent to which a congressional decision to
authorize adjudication of Article III business in a
non-Article III tribunal is valid, the Court has considered
6/ Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458
U.S. 50 (1982.
7/ Thomas v. Union Carbide Co., 105 S.Ct. 3325 (1985).
8/ CFTC v. Schor, 106 S.Ct. 3245 (1986).
9/ 106 S.Ct. 3245 (1986).
various factors. Among them, says the opinion of Justice
O'Connor, "are the extent to which the 'essential attributes
of judicial power' are reserved to Article III courts, and,
conversely, the extent to which the non-Article III forum
exercises the range of jurisdiction and powers normally
vested only in Article III courts, the origins and impor-
tance of t'be right to be adjudicated, and the concerns that
drove Congress to depart from the requirements of Article
I1." 10/
Here the delegation, like that in the leading case
of Crowell v. Benson, ll/ was limited to a particularized
area of law and the agency was not given "all ordinary
powers of district courts." 12/ Moreover, its orders are
reviewed on the same basis as the agency in Crowell. Under
Thomas, the fact that the counterclaim is a "private" right
is not determinative. The same is true of the state law
character of the claim. That the counterclaim is resolved
by a federal rather than a state tribunal does not unduly
impair state interests, since a federal court could decide a
counterclaim such as the one asserted here under its ancil-
lary jurisdiction. The fact that a federal agency rather
than a federal court hears the state law claim does not give
rise to a greater impairment of principles of federalism.
The Court's conclusion is thus that "the limited jurisdic-
tion that the CFTC asserts over state law claims as a
necessary incident to the adjudication of federal claims
willingly submitted by the parties for initial agency
adjudication does not contravene separation of powers
principles or Article III." 13/
It should, however, be noted that the Schor
opinion indicates that there may be a line beyond which
delegations of adjudicatory authority to agencies may not
go. Justice O'Connor gives the example of "Congress
[creat]ing a phalanx of non-Article III tribunals equipped
to handle the entire business of the Article III courts
10/ Id. at 3258.
ll/ 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
12/ 106 S.Ct. at 3259.
13/ Id. at 3261.
without any Article III supervision or control and without
evidence of valid and specific legislative necessities." 14/
Such a scenario is, of course, far removed from
reality in terms of what may happen in the foreseeable
future. Short of it, virtually all delegations of
adjudicatory authority should be valid, as long as the
decisions of the agency concerned are subject to judicial
review. Due process is not limited to judicial process.
There is no longer, if there ever was, a valid dichotomy
between what is judicial and what is administrative, at
least on the civil side of the law.
Schor confirms the movement that has occurred,
during this century, away from the notion that judicial
power may not be delegated to agencies--that administrative
adjudicatory power must be "softened by a quasi" 15/ before
it may be validly exercised. The courts have come to
recognize that agency adjudicatory authority is, from an
analytical point of view, exactly like the power to decide
cases possessed by the courts. The trend to that effect has
been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Ohio Civil Rights
Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools. 16/ The Court there
held that the Younger doctrine, 17/ under which a federal
court should not enjoin a pending state judicial proceeding,
also applies to a pending state administrative proceeding,
so long as in the course of that proceeding plaintiff will
have a full and fair opportunity to litigate his constitu-
tional claim. The key to the holding is the recognition
that administrative proceedings that are "judicial in
nature" should, "in proper circumstances command the respect
due court proceedings." 18/ If that is true, the reasons
which counsel application of the Younger abstention doctrine
in cases involving state courts should also apply here.
14/ Id. at 3260.
15/ Sprinqer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 210
(1928).
16/ 106 S.Ct. 2718 (1986).
17/ Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
18/ 106 S.Ct. at 2723.
The same approach governs the decision in Univer-
sity of Tennessee v, Elliott, 19/ which held that in
federal court actions under the reconstruction-era civil
rights statutes, the resolution by a state agency, acting in
its adjudicatory capacity, of disputed issues of fact which
are properly before it and which the parties have had
adequate opportunity to litigate, has the same preclusive
effect to which it would be entitled in the state's courts.
In the Court's view, traditional principles of preclusion
should be applied to "the burgeoning use of administrative
adjudication in the 20th century." 20/ Hence, "it is sound
policy to apply principles of issue preclusion to the
factfinding of administrative bodies acting in a judicial
capacity." 21/
As the Court saw it, "Giving preclusive effect to
administrative factfinding serves the value underlying
general principles of collateral estoppel, enforcing
repose." 22/ This value, which vindicates the interest in
avoiding the cost and vexation of repetitive litigation and
the interest in conserving judicial resources, is equally
implicated whether the factfinding is by a court or an
agency. Accordingly, when a state agency decides issues of
fact in an adjudicatory proceeding, the federal courts must
give the agency factfinding the same preclusive effect to
which it would be entitled in the state's courts. 23/
19/ 106 S.Ct. 3220 (1986).
20/ Id. at 3226.
21/ Id.
22/ Id. (citation omitted).
23/ Id. at 3227. See Wiconisco Creek v. Kocher Coal Co.,
641 F.Supp. 712 (M.D. Pa. 1986) (Pa. Dept. of Environmental
Resources not "court"); United States v. Doherty, 786 F.2d
491 (2d Cir. 1986) (magistrates and other court personnel
not "agency" within APA).
PROCEDURE PROBLEMS
The most important administrative procedure
question dealt with by the cases was that of the applicabil-
ity of the exclusionary rule in agency proceedings. 24/
The Supreme Court answered the question in the negative in
the Lopez-Mendoza case 25/ three years ago. Several cases
apply the Lopez-Mendoza rule to different administrative
proceedings. 26/ Of greater potential significance,
however, are two state cases which refuse to follow
Lopez-Mendoza. Thus, the Oklahoma court has specifically
held that the exclusionary rule is applicable in a hearing
resulting in the discharge of a firefighter for miscon-
duct. 27/ Evidence had been presented at the hearing which
had been obtained under an invalid search warrant. The
court held the evidence improper and the discharge conse-
quently improper.
The Oklahoma court recognized the contrary
approach of the Supreme Court, but it ruled that the protec-
tion afforded by the comparable Oklahoma constitutional
provision was greater than that under the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. The latest Supreme
Court cases on the exclusionary rule "are too restrictive
for application under the standards of Oklahoma's fundamen-
tal law." 28/ They leave "this Court . . . unfettered in
24/ For decisions holding there is a due process right to
be heard in liquor license cases, see Sea Girt Ass'n. v.
Borough, 625 F.Supp. 1482 (D.N.J. 1986); Fueston v. Colorado
Springs, 713 P.2d 1323 (Colo. App. 1985).
25/ INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
26/ Smith Steel Co. v. Brock, 800 F.2d 1329 (5th Cir.
1986) (OSHA proceedings to correct safety and health
standard violations); Pullin v. Louisiana State Racing
Comm'n, 477 S.2d 683 (La. 1985); Deshields v. Chester School
Dist., 505 A.2d 1080 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986).
27/ Turner v. City of Lawton, No. 61,399, slip op. (Okla.
July 22, 1986).
28/ Id. at 14.
its enforcement of the Oklahoma exclusionary rule." 29/
There is a similar decision by another state court 307 and
it may be hoped that this may lead other state courts to
hold that, despite Lopez-Mendoza, the exclusionary rule is
as binding in administrative proceedings as it is in crimi-
nal proceedings. 31/
Other cases deal with the different aspects of
agency procedure ranging from the notice which begins the
administrative process to the decision which is its last
stage. As a general proposition, the agency is vested with
considerable autonomy with regard to its procedural rules.
This point is emphasized in a Sixth Circuit case, which
states that review of procedural rules "is narrowly circum-
scribed" and the court only inquires whether there is a
reasonable basis for a challenged rule. 32/
Agency pleadings are to be judged liberally. Thus
the Massachusetts court emphasizes that the agency notice
need not be drafted with the certainty of a criminal pleading.
It is valid as long as enough is told to enable the individ-
ual to understand the substance and nature of the grounds
upon which the agency is acting. 33/
There were a number of interesting bias cases.
The most striking arose out of a decision favorable to the
private party by the Department of Agriculture Judicial
Officer. The department "violently disagreed" with this
decision. The Secretary then replaced the Judicial Officer
with a deputy assistant secretary, who was not even a
lawyer. Then a petition for reconsideration was filed by
the department and granted by the new Judicial Officer. The
court ruled that the department's action violated due
29/ Id.
30/ State v. Lampman, 724 P.2d 1092 (Wash. App. 1986).
31/ Compare Smith Steel Co. v. Brock, 800 F.2d 1329, 1331
(5th Cir. 1986) (exclusionary rule applicable where object
of OSHA proceeding to punish employer for past violations).
'32/ Brown v. NTSB, 795 F.2d 576, 578 (6th Cir. 1986).
33/ Langlitz v. Bd. of Registration of Chiropractors, 486
N.E.2d 48 (Mass. 1985).
process, citing the ancient maxim against permitting anyone
to be the judge of his own case. "All notions of judicial
impartiality would be abandoned, if the agency could replace
the "judge" who had decided against it and present a motion
for reconsideration to a new "judge" of its own choosing.
"Such manipulation of a judicial, or quasi-judicial, system
cannot be permitted." 34/
Bias is, of course, shown where the agency members
have a pecuniary and personal interest in the case. 35/
But it is not enough to show that the hearing officer had
previously practiced law with the agency prosecutors. 36/
Nor is bias shown by prejudgment on the legal or policy
issues involved in the case. 37/ Thus the fact that board
members had expressed beliefs on the proper scope of
chiropractic practice different from plaintiff's did not
indicate bias. 38/ The governing principles are well
stated by the Louisiana court: a preconceived position on
the law is not enough; but the same is not true where the
agency member makes an advance commitment on the adjudica-
tive facts. The test is whether he was a disinterested
observer or had he, on the contrary, judged the facts in
advance. 3§/
34/ Utica Packing Co. v. Block, 781 F.2d 71, 78 (6th Cir.
1986).
35/ Salisbury v. Housing Authority, 615 F.Supp. 1433 (E.D.
Ky. 1985).
36/ New York State Inspection v. New York State Pub.
Employment Relations Bd., 629 F.Supp. 33 (N.D.N.Y. 1984).
Compare Babcock Center v. Office of Audits, 334 S.E.2d 112
(S.C. 1985); Collura v. Bd. of Police Comm'rs, 482 N.E.2d
143 (Ill. App. 1985).
37/ NLRB v. Honaker Mills, 789 F.2d 262 (4th Cir. 1986);
Kizer v. Dorchester County Bd., 340 S.E.2d 144 (S.C. 1986).
38/ Samuel v. Bd., 712 P.2d 132 (Or. App. 1985). Compare
Orange v. Island Creek Co., 786 F.2d 724 (6th Cir. 1986)
(adverse rulings not enough to show bias).
39/ Matter of Rollins Services, 481 S.2d 113 (La. 1985).
See also Matter of Sorini, 717 P.2d 7 (Mont. 1986) (issue of
hearing officer independence not raised at hearing).
It is hornbook law that the rules of evidence are
not binding in agency proceedings. 40/ This means, of
course, that any evidence is admissible including hearsay if
responsible persons would rely on it. 41/ However, most
state courts continue to apply the legal residuum rule:
agency findings must be set aside if they are supported only
by incompetent evidence such as hearsay. 42/
A change in hearing officers or ALJs does not by
itself violate due process or the APA. 43/ On the other
hand, the SSA "targeting" of ALJs who had high rates of
allowing disability benefits was held to infringe upon the
claimant's due process rights. 44/ Another case reaches
the same result on the SSA attempt to experiment with
adversary procedure. Under the SSA experiment a government
counsel appears at a disability hearing to present the case
against the claimant. This deprives the SSA ALJ of one of
On ex parte communications and evidence see Southwest
Sunsites v. FTC, 785 F. 2d 1431 (9th Cir. 1986); Bonanza
Corp. v. United States, 642 F.Supp. 1170 (CIT 1986)
(internal investigation report); Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Ins.
Comm'r, 509 A.2d 719 (Md. App. 1986).
40/ Stigall v. Anchorage Municipality Police & Fire
Retirement Bd., 718 P.2d 943 (Alaska 1986).
41/ Id.; Evosevich v. Consolidation Coal Co., 789 F.2d
1021 (3d Cir. 1986); Craig v. Pare, 497 A.2d 316 (R.I.
1985).
42/ Thigpin v. Adm'r, Office of Employment Security, 488
S.2d 1213 (La. App. 1986); Noxubee County Bd. of Education
v. Givens, 481 S.2d 816 (Miss. 1985). Compare Ortiz v.
Eichler, 794 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1986) (cross-exam); Collura
v. Bd. of Police Comm'rs, 482 N.E.2d 143 (Ill. App. 1985)
(polygraph); Quaker Hill Place v. State Human Relations
Comm'n, 498 A.2d 175 (Del. Super. 1985) (medical periodicals
and treatise not in evidence).
43/ Aacon Auto v. ICC, 792 F.2d 1156 (D.C. Cir. 1986);
Rosales v. Dep't of Labor & Industries, 700 P.2d 748 (Wash.
App. 1985).
44/ Barry v. Heckler, 638 F.Supp. 444 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
his "three hats"--that of government advocate. The court
considers the experiment to be part of what it terms the
"astounding" efforts by "upper echelon [SSA] bureaucrats to
control the independence of ALJs." As such, the court
holds, the experiment violates both due process and statute:
it is "simply nothing more nor less than an attempt by the
bureaucracy to control the independence of the ALJs." 45/
It has long been a basic principle that agencies
may not issue bare thumbs-up or thumbs-down decisions.
Administrative decisions must be supported by adequate
findings. Findings are, of course, not adequate where they
merely parrot the statutory language without any supporting
statement of the underlying facts. 46/ One of the most
significant recent administrative law developments has been
the judicial tendency to convert the findings requirement
into one of reasoned decisions--at least in certain cases.
Thus, where an agency changes its policy or interpretation
or refuses to follow its precedents, the cases hold that it
must supply a reasoned analysis to support the change. 47/
A D.C. Circuit case goes further and rules that an agency
must give reasons for its refusal to issue declaratory
orders. While agencies have discretion to deny declaratory
relief, their denial may not be affirmed in the complete
absence of an explanation for that denial. 48/
45/ Salling v. Benson, 641 F.Supp. 1046, 1054, 1067 (W.D.
Va. 1986).
On agency review of ALJs see Parker v. Bowen, 788 F.2d
1512 (11th Cir. 1986); Heifetz v. Dep't., 475 S.2d 1277
(Fla. App. 1985).
On counsel see Trench v. INS, 783 F.2d 181 (10th Cir.
1986) (no right to appointed counsel).
46/ Texas Health Facilities Comm'n v. Presbyterian Hosp.,
690 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. 1985). See Illinois Commerce Comm'n v.
ICC, 787 F.2d 616 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
47/ NRDC v. EPA, 790 F.2d 289 (3d Cir. 1986);
International Alliance v. NLRB, 779 F.2d 552 (9th Cir.
1985); National Audubon Soc. v. Hester, 627 F.Supp. 1419
(D.C. 1986).
48/ Yakima Valley Cablevision v. FCC, 794 F.2d 737 (D.C.
The next step will undoubtedly be a more general
requirement of reasoned administrative decisions. Indeed,
according to Judge Posner, "there is considerable authority
that due process of law requires that the nonjudicial
decisionmaker--the agency or its hearing officer as distinct
from a judge or a jury--'should state the reasons for his
determination and indicate the evidence he relied on.'" He
explains the requirement as a "back-up safeguard, designed
to make sure, so far as it is possible to do so, that the
hearing which due process requires is a meaningful one, as
it would not be if the decisionmaker based his decision on
materials outside of the record that was complied at the
hearing, other than such extra-record materials as the
agency could properly take official notice of." 49/
Cir. 1986).
49/ Hamertman v. Chicago, 776 F.2d 636, 645 (7th Cir.
1985).
